What the Foreign Service Can Learn from the U.S. Military
Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Thomas Ricks's latest book, The Generals, is a fascinating study of U.S. Army commanders from WWII to the present. It's an excellent evaluation of good vs. bad leadership. What particularly struck me were parallels to the Foreign Service and lessons that should be learned and applied. Following are highlights:
On Mediocrity
An Army battalion commander said, "in today’s Army, the B-minus and C-plus officer fares better than the A performer who occasionally takes risks and fails." "The personnel equivalent of Gresham’s Law is that bad leaders drive out good ones."
"a study in 2010 by the Army Reserve Institute concluded that 'the main reason talented people leave is not the lure of a lucrative civilian career, but because mediocre people stay in and get promoted.'"
"success rarely can be rewarded adequately if failure carries little or no consequence. Nor will the standout officer be watched and imitated as he or she should be."
Admiral Arleigh Burke said, "the first thing that a commander must learn is not to tolerate incompetence. As soon as you tolerate incompetence…you have an incompetent organization."
Keep the Outliers & Innovators
"In considering 360's, it is also important that they do not reward the pleasant conformists and punish the brilliant outliers… All too often, an officer is promoted not for professional competence but…for being" a member of the club.
Gen. George C. Marshall wrote, "There are very few of them, (who) are of that unusual type who enthuse all of their subordinates and carry through almost impossible tasks."
There is a need "to keep alive the careers of outliers and innovators…so that they can be called upon during a crisis."
Paul Yingling said, "in large organizations, the challenge is to keep the skeptics from becoming extinct."
"Leadership should not be seen as a matter of officers taking turns or waiting in line."
"We also should reward commanders who cultivate and maintain cultures in which their subordinates feel free to exercise initiative and speak their minds freely."
Petraeus was fond of a company commander’s sign put up in western Baghdad which said, "In absence of orders and guidance, figure out what they should have been and exercise vigorously."
On the Need to Be Able to Fire Incompetents
"Relief then can be seen…not as a sign of the system failing but rather as a sign that the system is working."
"when making such reliefs, it probably is better to announce them, in order to remove the mystery and dispel rumors… A relieved commander's peers need to be informed about why something has happened so they can learn from it."
"Failure to relieve is sometimes a form of leadership indiscipline."
On Bureaucratic Resistance to Change
A 2011 study by Harvard’s School of Government found that most young Army officers left due to "limited ability to control their own careers” and “frustration with the military bureaucracy."
"The former officers overwhelmingly believed that the Army did not reward talent with faster promotions and did not do a good job of matching talent to jobs." Among their recommendations: "Be willing to fire people for poor performance.” Most valued talent in the Army: "don't rock the boat."
"Any attempt to make such reforms will be attacked by the military bureaucracy." We should be wary when it "rejects suggested changes and defends current personnel policies on the grounds of ‘fairness.'" This "puts the interests of the officers and bureaucracy above those of the rank and file and the nation as a whole."
Retired FSO, Jon P. Dorschner wrote about this need to take lessons from the U.S. military as well -- Why the Foreign Service Should Be More Like the Army -- in the June 2011 issue of the Foreign Service Journal. The son of an Army colonel and a former instructor at West Point, Mr. Dorschner addresses particularly the personal and moral side of things:
Importance of Esprit de Corps
"I have never heard esprit de corps mentioned in the Foreign Service context. Instead, the Foreign Service emphasizes individuality over collegiality, exclusivity over inclusiveness. This is a hangover from its earlier history, when its membership was largely restricted to East Coast elites who were 'male, pale and Yale.'"
"Yet class prejudices still linger and the Foreign Service often continues to connote elitism. What individual officers bring in the form of social class, elite education and family connections can still play a big role in placement and career advancement."
Primacy of Mission
In the military, "the goal comes first and units are told to work cohesively to ensure successful completion of the mission. Individuals who showboat and subordinate the mission to their individual ambition do not do well and are singled out for correction. By contrast, the Foreign Service spends little or no time explaining to its members why they are doing what they are doing. Instead, duties are often performed mechanically. The mission becomes subordinate to the procedures. This is a common curse of bureaucratic organizations, and State Department bureaucracy is legendary."
"Just as takes place in the Army, Foreign Service personnel should be told how their efforts fit into broader U.S. foreign policy and how their hard work and sacrifice benefit the nation. Otherwise, there is often no sense that a mission has been accomplished."
Need for Transparency
"Foreign Service members who serve repeatedly in hardship posts are not provided a career advantage. Those who demonstrate dedication, hard work and technical expertise are not necessarily rewarded with regular promotions or choice assignments. This vagueness leads to accusations that 'it is not what you know but who you know,' and erodes morale."
Equal Treatment for All - Enforce the Rules
"The State Department issues rules and then almost immediately makes exceptions to them. There are limits on how long personnel can serve in Washington, D.C. Those who do not serve in hardship posts are supposed to face negative consequences. Those who do not fulfill their language requirements are supposed to pay the price."
"Like the military, we must staff positions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan that are dangerous and require separation from family. Everyone is supposed to pull their fair share, but for some reason it just doesn't happen. There always seem to be people who are able to manipulate the system. They stay in Washington longer than they are supposed to and avoid hardship tours, yet continue to be promoted."
"A rule is a rule and must be enforced. Otherwise, the perception grows that the institution is not interested in fairness."
Controlling Egos
"West Point cadets with large egos, who constantly tell their peers that they will become generals and who seek as much 'face time' as possible with officers, are known as 'tools.' Being a tool is not a good thing. This does not mean that the military does not reward strong personalities, of course. Ambition is the first requirement for anyone aspiring to make the higher grades, after all. But the system teaches such individuals to rein in some of that egoistic behavior."
"West Point cadets learn that the most egotistical general is not always the most successful, and that an effective institution must make room for different leadership styles. Or, to put it another way: A little humility is not a bad thing. Perhaps the Foreign Service could benefit from a similar teaching model."
Looking After Subordinates' Interests
"Officers and NCOs so egotistical and wrapped up in their own advancement that they do not show concern for the well being of their subordinates receive poor evaluations and do not progress in their careers. From the outset, Army personnel are taught this essential component of leadership. By contrast, concern for subordinates is not part of the State Department evaluation process. Nor is there much emphasis on families. Instead, officers are taught to look after themselves and their careers first and foremost. This can lead, rightly or wrongly, to a perception by subordinates that 'successful' Foreign Service officers are those willing to do anything to get ahead, including letting down colleagues and disappointing subordinates."
"These allegations arise out of the fact that such self-centered behavior is seldom punished in the Foreign Service. Selfishness and excessive egotism are not viewed as indicators of poor leadership and a lack of esprit de corps, but are often seen as the norm."
What are the chances that the USG and Department of State will pay heed and reform, adopting useful lessons from our military? Note the following:
“One of the worst abuses in the conduct of our foreign affairs is our habit of appointing ‘lame ducks,’ second-rate politicians and other incompetents, to important positions of international commissions or as delegates to international conferences. The other civilized nations as a rule appoint their government experts and diplomatic and consular representatives to these positions with the consequence that their representatives grow in wisdom and acquire a larger confidence and recognition from their fellow citizens.”