Planning for a Post-Putin Future: Actions to Take Now
"Unless the West wants a new bandit in charge of nuclear Russia, it needs to bet big on the Russian democratic anti-war opposition, and grant it agency."
There are two visions of Russia’s future: one regressive, the other progressive. Vladimir Putin’s autocratic rule encompasses the former. An assortment of oppositionists mostly embrace the latter. With Putin’s 23-year hold on power now appearing to be shaky, the U.S. and its allies must step up forward-looking programs now to help guide Russia in the right direction — toward democracy and rule of law.
Vladimir Putin’s Russia “is a peculiar hybrid: an almost medieval court perched atop a modern, bureaucratic state,” writes Russia scholar Mark Galeotti in The Economist. Putin’s vozhd, leader-centric model is brittle, anti-modern and appears finally to be cracking.
Recognizing this, leading Russian opposition figures are appealing to the West for help in their quest to usher their country toward a 21st century model of a law-based democracy not under the thumbs of corruption-ridden oligarchs and siloviki strongmen.
Jailed dissident Alexei Navalny calls on the West to “make its strategic vision of Russia as a parliamentary democracy as clear as possible.”
Similarly, exiled opposition activist Mikhail Khodorkovsky asserts that “Unless the West wants a new bandit in charge of nuclear Russia, it needs to bet big on the Russian democratic anti-war opposition, and grant it agency. If Western authorities recognize opposition institutions as legitimate representatives of Russian society with the associated opportunities, this will help the opposition compete with the militarized national patriots.”
The Ukraine conflict currently defines our relations with Moscow. My perusal of recent commentary on Russia policy reveals a near universal focus on the need for containment. The same holds for the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy document. Its only nod to a post-Putin Russia is a final single sentence: “[I]t is the Russian people who will determine Russia’s future as a major power capable of once more playing a constructive role in international affairs.”
The U.S. State Department’s and USAID’s descriptions of Washington’s efforts to promote Russian civil society and rule of law largely capture what the U.S. has done since communism fell as opposed to current and forward-looking programs. Putin terminated these programs inside Russia.
Apart from border-transiting informational efforts such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under the auspices of the U.S. Agency for Global Media, little can be done on the ground inside of Russia until there is a change in governance.
The main Russian opposition groups, as is usually the case with exiled opposition groups, are divided and often at odds with each other. These include the Russian Action Committee, founded by Khodorkovsky and Garry Kasparov, and the Congress of People’s Deputies, initiated by former Duma deputy Ilya Ponomaraev. It is unclear how much support these or armed insurgents, such as the Freedom of Russia Legion and the Russian Volunteer Corps, backed by Ukrainian military intelligence, have inside Russia.
Having dealt with exiled political groups for many years throughout my diplomatic career, the one major lesson that was clear was not to officially endorse any political grouping, while, at the same time, being in constant touch with most. Urging unity and collaboration is fine; getting deeply involved in groups’ inter- and internal dynamics is not. Self-determination absent foreign interference is the watchword — admittedly, easier said than done.
How Russia defines itself determines how we deal with it, particularly after its inevitable failure in Ukraine and Putin’s departure from power. That said, following are steps we can initiate now (if they have not been already).
Task the intelligence community and State Department with the following:
draw up a Memorandum of Notification aka “Presidential Finding” for realistic actions we can take to encourage opposition to Putin and the means to undercut his power and influence domestically.
identify what players are likely to succeed Putin in power.
identify key Russian constituencies we need to engage with to include political opposition, but also military and intelligence figures and business and economic players. How do we engage, when, and what is our message?
formulate policy options on how to deal with a post-Putin Russia, to include stable control over nuclear weapons.
provide options on how to respond to a potential geographic breakup of Russia’s regions.
produce recommendations for coordinating with our allies on dealing with a post-Putin Russia.
Discreetly opening back channels selectively with Russian military, intelligence and security figures is, obviously, very sensitive. U.S. military and intelligence officials and others with the right contacts should be tasked with discreetly reaching out to counterparts inside Russia’s military and security apparatus with essentially two messages: 1) Putin has set Russia on a destructive path; and 2) the United States is ready, willing and able to help Russia get on the right path toward reform. Reaching out to these players will help position us to move quickly to re-engage and hopefully influence their thinking toward constructive changes in future governance.
Many of the actions we took in the 1990s are worth dusting off and updating. A valuable resource is former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul’s 2005 analysis, “American Efforts at Promoting Regime Change in the Soviet Union and then Russia: Lessons Learned.” He outlines four factors which inhibited our efforts: 1) low priority by the U.S. government; 2) lack of a coherent U.S. strategy; 3) weak Russian democratic actors; and 4) Russia’s vastness.
Actions for re-engagement should include re-establishing connections between U.S. civil society institutions and Russian counterparts — e.g., think tanks and academia, National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, nongovernmental organizations promoting justice, democracy and human rights, labor organizations, etc. The U.S. Agency for International Development’s funding of pro-democracy efforts should also be resurrected in robust form. See McFaul’s paper for a fulsome description of U.S. efforts during those post-Soviet years.
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya, of the Center for a New American Security, recommend broadening engagement with the disparate Russian diaspora, thousands of whom were civil society and sector leaders before fleeing their country. Many, if not most, wish to return home after Putin is gone and can be expected to be powerful agents for change.
Their recommendations include: 1) identify key actors, organizing efforts, policy goals, etc; 2) support exiled Russian civil society organizations, such as the Free Russia Foundation and the Ark, in housing needs, coworking facilities and language training; 3) create a program for human rights advocates and journalists to include professional fellowships, language training and professional networking in the U.S. and other countries; 4) make it easier for persecuted Russian activists to enter, work and remain in the U.S; and 5) set up mechanisms to foster cooperation and dialogue between the Russian and Ukrainian diasporas as a basis for future healing between the two peoples and improving relations at the national level.
Preparing for a post-Putin era admittedly is a tall order given Russia’s stunted and weak civil society, the sheer vastness of the country, and recognizing that change must come from the Russian people themselves. Events, however, may move faster than we anticipate. We and our allies therefore need to start looking past the conflict phase and begin building the foundation to help the Russian people to finally unshackle themselves from a cruel history and join the ranks of democratic nations.
The opinions and characterizations in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent official positions of the U.S. government.
(NB: elements of an earlier essay on this subject have been updated and incorporated into this one.)